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By John Y. Gotanda*
I. Introduction
The awarding of arbitration costs and attorneys’ fees in international arbitrations is often
arbitrary and unpredictable. In one recent investment arbitration where the tribunal deciding a
case under the auspices of the international Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) had broad discretion to award costs and fees, the tribunal allocated arbitration costs
evenly amongst the claimant and respondent and required each party to bear its own fees and
expenses, even though the claimant prevailed.1 In another case where the claimant was
successful on its substantive claim, the ICSID tribunal ordered the respondent to pay the
claimant US$6 million for legal fees, but required the parties to bear the costs of the arbitration
equally.2 And in still another recent investment arbitration the unsuccessful respondent was
ordered to pay the costs of the arbitration, but each party was responsible for its own legal fees.3
These results are not unique to investment arbitrations; they can also be found in international
commercial arbitrations.4
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Saipem S.p.A. v. The People's Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/07 (Bangladesh/Italy BIT),
Award, 30 June 2009, available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/SaipemBangladeshAwardJune3009_002.pdf.
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Award, 24 July 2008, paras. 812-13, available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Biwateraward.pdf .
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See, e.g., Final Award in case no. 13278 (ICC), reprinted in 31 Y.B. Com. Arb.118 (2008) (claimant won and
tribunal ordered claimant to bear 30% of the arbitration costs and the respondent to bear the remaining 70%, and
required respondent to a portion of the claimant’s legal fees); Final Award of 30 August 2005 (NAI 2005), reprinted
in 32 Y.B. Com. Arb. 107 (2007) (claimant won 75% of its claims and tribunal ordered respondent to bear all costs of
the arbitration and required each party to bear their own legal costs); Case no. 11307 of 2003, Final Award (ICC
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The lack of uniformity in the awarding of costs and fees poses two major problems. First,
arbitrary awards undermine the legitimacy of the dispute resolution system. Second, the lack of
predictability may hinder parties from being able to settle the dispute and could rob arbitration of
its efficiency. These problems are exacerbated in the international context because the costs and
fees in transnational disputes can run into the millions of dollars. Indeed, in one recent
celebrated arbitration, the costs and fees totaled over US$21 million.5
This contribution to the liber amicorum examines the awarding of costs and fees in
international arbitrations. As the work of Bernardo Cremades has focused on both international
commercial arbitration and transnational investment disputes, this paper compares the practice of
awarding costs and fees under each. My study finds that awards of costs and fees are arbitrary
and unpredictable under both systems. To remedy these problems, I propose two different
approaches: one for ICSID tribunals and another for international commercial arbitrations. In
the case of ICSID arbitrations, I advocate that the institution adopt a default rule providing for
the parties to share equally the costs of the arbitration and bear their own legal expenses. In
essence, I propose that ICSID adopt what has become known as the American Rule with respect
to the awarding of costs and fees. This approach is needed to bring predictability to the field,
provide greater administrative efficiency, and reduce the overall costs. In the case of
international commercial arbitrations, I argue that parties should be free to select the method for
resolving claims for costs and fees, including authorizing the tribunal to resolve such claims
pursuant to the principle of “costs follow the event” or the “loser pays” rule. In this context, the

2003), reprinted in 33 Y.B. Com. Arb. 24 (2008) (claimant prevailed, but tribunal divided equally the costs of the
arbitration and ordered the parties to bear their own legal costs); Case no. 12421 / MS of 2005, Final Award (ICC
2005), reprinted in 33 Y.B. Com. Arb. 102 (2008) (claimant won on liability but was awarded only nominal damages
and tribunal divided equally the costs of the arbitration and ordered the respondent to pay 70% of the claimant’s
legal costs).
5
See PSEG Global Inc. v. Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award of 17 January 2007, paras. 353, available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/PSEGGlobal-Turkey-Award.pdf.
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adoption of the American Rule would not achieve the same administrative and economic
benefits, and the principle of party autonomy calls for this different approach.
II. Overview
A. Defining Costs and Fees in International Arbitrations
The costs of international arbitration are two-fold and consist of the costs of the proceeding
and the costs of the parties.6 The proceeding’s costs generally include administrative fees,
tribunal fees, and costs associated with the tribunal. The parties’ costs are principally comprised
of legal costs: attorneys’ fees, expert fees and related expenses.7
Administrative fees involve filing costs and the tribunal’s fees and expenses. In general,
these expenses are greater for arbitrations than for court proceedings because the State subsidizes
costs for the latter.8 For example, the administrative fees for a US$10 million dispute before the
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) are US$51,400.9 By contrast, the filing fee in the US
District Court for the Southern District of New York is US$350.10
Tribunal fees consist mostly of the arbitrators’ fees and are calculated by a variety of
methods. One of the most prominent approaches assesses fees by the ad valorem method, which
calculates the tribunal’s fee as a fixed percentage of the total amount in dispute. The ICC

6

See F. Gurry, “Fees & Costs,” 6 World Arb. & Mediation Rep. 233 (1995). A. Redfern & M. Hunter, Law
and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, p. 469 (4th ed. 2004).
7
See Redfern & Hunter, op. cit., p. 270.
8
See R. Kreindler, “Introduction,” Transnational Litigation, p. 272 (1997).
9
International Court of Arbitration, Cost Calculator, http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/display10/index.html
(last visited June 9, 2009).
10
See Southern District of New York Fee Schedule, available at http://www1.nysd.uscourts.gov/courtrules (last
visited June 9, 2009). See also C. Drahozal, “Arbitration Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence,” 41
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 813 (2008) (finding that “the upfront costs of arbitration [in U.S.
domestic consumer and employment disputes] will in many cases be higher than, and at best be the same as, the
upfront costs in litigation”). However, in England, court fees fund approximately 80% of the cost of operating civil
and family courts, while the remaining 20% is financed by taxpayers. See R. Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation
Costs: Preliminary Report, p. 63 (May 2009), available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about_judiciary/costreview/preliminary-report.htm.
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follows this approach. It determines arbitrators’ fees by assigning different minimum and
maximum percentages to each consecutive portion of the disputed amount.11 For example, for a
US$10 million dispute, the fee for each arbitrator would range from US$36,470 to
US$176,000.12 The ICC sets the exact amount within this range by considering the diligence of
the arbitrators, time spent, and the rapidity of the proceeding and the complexity of the argument.
Other approaches for calculating the arbitrators’ fees include the time spent method and the
fixed fee method.13

The time spent method allocates the arbitration fee according to an hourly

rate, which is contingent on the size, prominence and intricacy of the arbitration.14 According to
the 2008 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) fee schedule,
arbitrators generally make US$3000 per day for work associated with the proceeding.15
Additionally, the rules of the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) provide that an
arbitrator’s fee cannot exceed £350 per hour.16 By contrast, the fixed fee method has been
utilized in cases of great importance where the arbitrators are internationally known.17 However,
this approach often causes difficulty in fee assessment, because of the challenges associated with
predicting the length of an upcoming arbitration.18
Other costs associated with arbitration are tribunal expenses, such as the costs of translators,
stenographers, interpreters and the tribunal’s experts.19 Tribunal expenses, like administrative
fees, are typically subsidized in court proceedings, but are ordinarily assumed by the parties in
arbitration.

11

See Redfern & Hunter, op. cit., p. 271.
International Court of Arbitration, Cost Calculator, op. cit.
13
See Redfern & Hunter, op. cit., pp. 272-73.
14
Ibid., p. 272.
15
ICSID, “Schedule of Fees for January 2008”, http://icsid.worldbank.org (last visited June 18, 2009).
16
LCIA Arbitration Rules, Costs, http://www.lcia-arbitration.com/, (last visited June 18, 2009).
17
See Redfern & Hunter, op. cit., p. 272.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid., p. 470.
12
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The parties’ costs consist of all expenses necessary to present their arguments. The
parties’ costs mainly include attorneys’ fees. Other expenses include the parties’ professional
service fees such as technical advisers and experts, the parties’ witness fees, and incidental costs
such as secretarial fees, telephone facsimile and copying charges.20
Cost and fees in international arbitrations can be substantial. For instance, in PSEG Global
Inc. and Konya Ilgin Elektrik Uretim Ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Republic of Turkey the total
arbitration and legal costs amounted to approximately US$ 21M.21 Additionally, in Plama
Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, the unsuccessful claimant was ordered to pay (1) all
of the arbitral expenses, amounting to approximately US$1 million, and (2) US$7M to
respondent for legal costs (which amounted to approximately one half of respondent’s claimed
legal costs).22
B. Methods for Allocating Costs and Fees
1. Costs Follow the Event
Most jurisdictions apportion costs and fees between the parties according to the costs
follow the event (CFE) method, which provides that the losing party pay the winning party’s
expenses.23 Its purposes are to indemnify the winning party, reduce frivolous law suits, and
punish the losing party for wrongfully bringing or defending an action. While traditionally this

20

See W. Craig et al., International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration, p. 393 (3d ed. 2000).
See PSEG Global Inc. v. Turkey, op. cit., para. 353. However, litigation before national courts can cost even
more. For instance, Exxon claimed its attorneys’ fees and costs amounted to US$70 million in the Valdez litigation.
See In Re Exxon Valdez, No. 04-35182, 2009 U.S. App LEXIS 12713 (9th Cir. June 15, 2009).
22
Plama Consortium Limited v. Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, 27 August 2008, paras. 310-312,
324, available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/PlamaBulgariaAward.pdf.
23
See W. Pfennigstorf, “The European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting,” 47 Law & Contemporary
Problems, p. 40 (1984); See also Engelmann, The Roman Procedure, in A History of Continental Civil
Procedure, p. 271 (R. Millar ed. & trans., 1927).
21
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method had a punitive component, it has not been viewed as violating public policy.24 Today, it
is well settled that the primary policy for CFE is to make the claimant whole.25 Additionally, by
increasing the costs of losing a case, parties are discouraged from bringing insubstantial claims.26
Article 394 of the Spanish Code of Civil Procedure illustrates the CFE method.27 It
provides that a losing party pay the prevailing party’s costs and fees if (1) the winning party
prevails on all claims, (2) the losing party fails on all claims, and (3) the court finds that the case
did not raise significant factual and legal concerns.28 In other countries, like Australia and
Canada, courts enjoy broad discretion to award costs and fees; however, the prevailing practice is
to shift costs to the losing party.29
With respect to the proportion of costs and fees that are shifted, courts typically award all
allowable costs and fees to the winning party.30 However, some courts award costs and fees in
proportion to the claims won.31 Moreover, in many countries, awards of costs and fees are
subject to various restrictions. In Spain, for instance, a winning party may receive only costs

24

See J. Wetter & C. Priem, “Costs and Their Allocation in International Commercial Arbitrations,” 2 Am.
Rev. Int’l Arb., pp. 251, 329 (1991); See also G. Graham-Green, “Taxation of Costs in the Supreme Court,”
49 Arbitration, pp. 319, 353 (1984).
25
See T. Rowe, “The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview,” 1982 Duke L.J. 651, pp.
653-54.
26
See Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967) (citing Oelrichs v. Spain, 15
Wall. 211, 231 (1872)).
27
“Ley de enjuiciamiento civil,” art. 394 (Tecnos Editorial, 2008).
28

Ibid.

29

See Cie Price Ltee v. Deniso Lebel Inc. [1996] R.J.Q. 2085 (C.A.) (Ques); Hospitality Corp. of Manitoba Inc. v.
North Am. Bldg. Ltd. [1994] 70 W.A.C. 292, 95 Man. R. (2d) 292 (C.A.) (Man.); Vipond v. Sisco [1913] 14 D.L.R.
129 (Ont. S.C.); Ritter v. Godfrey (1919) 2 K.B. 47; Donald Campbell & Co. v. Pollak (1927) A.C. 732; Morosi v.
Mirror Newspapers Ltd. (1977) 2 N.S.W.R. 749; E.M.I. Records Ltd. v. Ian Cameron Wallace Ltd. (1982) 3 W.L.R.
245. For a detailed examination of litigation costs under the English system, see R. Jackson, Review of Civil
Litigation Costs: Preliminary Report (May 2009), available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about_judiciary/costreview/preliminary-report.htm.
30
See E. Schwartz, “The ICC Arbitral Process, Part IV: The Costs of ICC Arbitration,” 4 Bull. ICC Int’L Ct. Arb.,
p. 21 (1993) (noting that in England the general rule is that all allowable costs shall be borne by the unsuccessful
party).
31
See ibid. (stating that Germany, Switzerland and Austria allocate costs in proportion to the outcome of the case);
Wetter & Priem, op. cit., p. 274 (explaining that Sweden allocates costs “inter parties on a sliding scale
proportionate to the assessment by the court of the claims made by the parties”).
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equivalent to one-third of the amount claimed in the action.32 In other countries, such as
Germany, the amount of fees that may be awarded is set pursuant to a mandatory schedule.33
Many countries extend the CFE method to arbitration.34 For example, laws in England
and Mexico state that the tribunal should award costs according to CFE.35 Specifically, the
English Arbitration Act provides “unless the parties otherwise agree, the tribunal shall award
costs on the general principle that costs should follow the event except where it appears to the
tribunal that this principle is not appropriate in relation to the whole or part of the costs.”36
The CFE method is also incorporated into many arbitral rules. For instance, the
Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
state that the arbitration costs “shall in principle be borne by the unsuccessful party” tribunal;
however, the tribunal has broader discretion in allocating legal costs.37 Similarly, the LCIA
Rules gives the tribunal the authority to shift costs and stipulates that awards should be
proportioned based on the relative successes of the parties.38
Other rules, while not explicitly granting cost shifting, authorize tribunals to do so. For
instance, according to ICSID’s General Procedural Provisions Rule 28, unless the agreement
states otherwise, the tribunal may award “the fees and expenses of the tribunal and the charges
32

See F. Pombo, Doing Business in Spain § 23.01[5][iv] (1996).

33

See Zivilproze̙ordnung [ZPO] (Ger.).
See J. Gotanda, Supplemental Damages in Private International Law, pp. 153-73 (1998) (surveying national laws
on the awarding of costs and fees in arbitration).
35
See Arbitration Act, 1996 § 61(2) (Eng.), reprinted in 2 Halsbury’s Statutes of England and Wales 71 (4th ed.
1996) (providing that in the absence of a contrary agreement, “the tribunal shall award costs on the general principle
that costs should follow the event except where it appears to the tribunal that in the circumstances this is not
appropriate in relation to the whole or part of the costs”); Cod.Com., art. 1454 (Mex.) (stating that, subject to
exceptions, the costs of the arbitration shall be borne by the losing party).
36
See English Arbitration Act (1996) Section 61(2).
37
See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Art.40(1), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf.
38
See London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) Rules art. 28.4 provides:
Unless the parties otherwise agree in writing, the Arbitral Tribunal shall make its order
on both arbitration and legal costs on the general principle that costs should follow the
result of the award or arbitration except where it appears to the Arbitral Tribunal that in
the particular circumstances this approach is inappropriate.
34
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for the use of the facility for the Centre.”39 Additionally, although the ICC Rules do not
recommend a basis for awarding costs, they do give the tribunal the discretion to allocate
expenses.40
2. The American Rule
In contrast to the CFE approach, the American Rules provides for each party to pay for
its own expenses.41 This approach is mainly followed in the U.S.42 When the U.S. Supreme
Court adopted the American Rule in 1796, it set forth three reasons for the practice.43 First, such
an award may be viewed as punishing losing parties, which may be unfair because legal
outcomes are uncertain. Second, increasing the losing parties’ costs may deter the poor from
bringing suit. Third, shifting costs may increase time, expense and the difficulty of proof.
However, even in the U.S., the American Rule is far from absolute.44 Over two hundred federal
statutes allow for attorneys’ fees awards.45 Additionally, U.S. courts generally allow fee shifting
for malicious claims and when the parties’ agreement allows for it.46
In domestic U.S. arbitrations, tribunals traditionally follow the American Rule with
respect to arbitration and legal costs.47 On the federal level, while the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) is silent on awarding costs and fees, many courts have held that arbitrators seated in the
U.S. in domestic arbitration under the FAA cannot allocate these items unless the agreement
39

See ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/basicen.htm (follow Part F; then follow Part III, Rule 28). (last visited June 10, 2009).
40
See Born, op. cit., p. 2497.
41
See Alaska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). For a discussion of attorneys’ fees in
the United States, see R. L. Rossi, Attorneys’ Fees (1973 & Supp. 1994); 10 C. Wright et al., Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2675 (1983).
42
See J. Gotanda, “Awarding Costs and Attorneys’ Fees in International Commercial Arbitration,” 21 Mich. L. Rev.,
p. 10 n.39 (1999).
43
Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306 (1796).
44
See ibid.; Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967); Oelrichs v. Spain, 83 U.S. 211
(1872).
45
See Wetter & Priem, op. cit., p. 284.
46
See Gotanda, op. cit., p. 13.
47
See T. Oehmke, Commercial Arbitration, § 123:01 (1997).
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explicitly provides for it.48 On the local level, many American states have adopted the Uniform
Arbitration Act (UAA) or a revised version of it, which provides that “[u]nless otherwise
provided for in the agreement to arbitrate, the arbitrator’s expenses and fees, together with other
expenses, not including counsel fees, incurred in the conduct of the arbitration, shall be paid as
provided in the award.”49 Therefore, arbitral costs awards may be shifted; however, tribunals
have ruled that attorneys’ fees may not be awarded unless the agreement or an applicable statute
states otherwise.50
In recent years, arbitrators have shifted costs and fees in a number of instances. For
example, arbitrators may award costs if the agreement allows for it.51 Additionally, tribunals
may shift costs and fees if provided for in the applicable law or arbitral rules.52 For instance, the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) rules authorize the arbitrators to allocate the fees,
expenses and compensation of the tribunal as they deem fit and to shift attorneys’ fees “if all
parties have requested such an award or it is authorized by law or their arbitration agreement.”53
Moreover, a number of states have adopted rules that allow for allocating costs and fees in
international arbitrations.54 For instance, in international arbitrations, a California statute states
that “in making an award for costs the arbitral tribunal may include as costs … legal fees and
expenses.”55 By contrast, in domestic arbitrations in California, each party pays its own pro rata

48

See Born, op. cit., p. 2492.
Uniform Arbitration Act § 10, 7 U.L.A. 250 (1997).
50
See Gotanda, op. cit. See also Canon Sch. Dist. No. 50 v. W.E.S. Constr. Co., 882 P.2d 1274, 1277-79 (Ariz.
1994) (upholding the arbitration award, but striking down the attorneys’ fee award because the UAA clearly
delineates that attorneys’ fees are only awarded if provided for in the parties’ arbitration agreement).
51
See Gotanda, op. cit., pp. 12-13.
52
Ibid., p. 13..
53
See Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures, Rule 43(d), available at
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=36094 (last visited June 29, 2009). With regard to administrative fees, tribunal
expenses and arbitrator compensation, Rule 43(c) states that “the arbitrator may apportion such fees, expenses, and
compensation among the parties in such amounts as the arbitrator determines is appropriate.”
54
See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1297.318 (West 1998); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 684.19(3)-(4) (West 1996); Haw.
Rev. Stat. § 685D-7 (Michie 1996); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 249-31, §§ 6-8 (West 1996).
55
See Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 1297.318 (West 1988 & Supp. 1999).
49
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expenses including arbitrators’ costs, unless the agreement provides otherwise.56 In addition,
though attorneys’ fees are generally unavailable in domestic arbitration, arbitrators may award
them if a party has acted in bad faith.57
III. Awards of Costs and Fees in International Arbitrations
The conventional wisdom holds that in international arbitrations, tribunals follow the
CFE approach in accordance with the practice of most countries.58 Unfortunately, there exists
very little empirical data on the subject.59 A few limited studies have found that the conventional
wisdom may not be true, and recent decisions seem to indicate that awards of costs and fees are
often arbitrary and unpredictable.
With respect to international commercial arbitrations, one study of ICC awards rendered
between 1989-1991 found that in 81% of the cases where the claimant prevailed, the respondent
was ordered to pay all or most of the arbitration costs. However, in only 50% of the same cases,
were the respondents ordered to pay some portion of the claimant’s legal fees.60
A number of recent international commercial arbitrations, published in the 2007 and 2008
Yearbooks of Commercial Arbitration, indicate similar conclusions, but also suggested that
awards can be quite arbitrary. For example, out of the six ICC cases where the claimant was
successful, some amount of costs and fees were awarded to the winning party in five of those
cases.61 However, of those five cases, three awards allocated a greater percentage of arbitral

56

See Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 1248.2 (West 1988).
See Widell v. Wolf, 43 F.3d 1150 (7th Cir. 1994 ) (bad faith exception); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line,
Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1991) (same).
58
See World Duty Free Company Limited v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/07, 4 October 2006,
available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/WDF-Kenya_Award.pdf; M. Weiniger & M. Page,
“Treaty Arbitration and Investment Dispute: Adding up the Costs,” 1:3 Global Arb. Rev., p. 44 (2006).
59
This is not surprising as one of the hallmarks of international arbitration is that it affords parties a private means
for resolving disputes. See G. Born, International Commercial Arbitration, vol. 1, p. 87 (2009).
60
Y. Derains & E. Schwartz, A Guide to the New ICC Rules of Arbitration, pp.431-44 (1998).
61
See, e.g., Award in case no. 12127 of 2003 (ICC 2003), reprinted in 31 Y.B. Com. Arb. 82 (2008), Final Award in
case no. 13278 (ICC 200_), reprinted in 31 Y.B. Com. Arb. 118 (2008), Case no. 12421 / MS of 2005, Final Award
57
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costs than legal fees.62 Two recent awards rendered under the auspices of the Netherlands
Arbitration Institute (NAI) also favored allocating arbitration costs over legal fees. In both cases,
the successful parties were awarded all arbitration costs, but they received only part or none of
their legal fees. This trend includes tribunals deciding international commercial disputes under
the auspices of the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission
(CIETAC).63 One study found that CIETAC tribunals awarded arbitration costs in
approximately 90% of the three hundred awards studied, while attorneys’ fees were only
awarded in 28% of those cases.64
With respect to investment arbitrations, in 2007, Susan Franck published a study of 102
international investment arbitration awards, fifty of which contained decisions for costs.
However, only seventeen of those quantified the award of costs and fees.65 Franck found that the
average award for tribunal costs was US$581,332.70. She also found little variation between the
awards for private parties and governments.66 With respect to attorneys’ fees, thirteen of the
fifty-four decisions that mentioned legal costs shifted those costs.67 But only eleven of the
thirteen cases quantified the attorneys’ fee award, with an average of US$655,407.68 Lastly,
private parties paid nearly twice as much in attorneys’ fees as compared with governmental
(ICC 2005), reprinted in 33 Y.B. Com. Arb. 102 (2008), Final Award on jurisdiction in case no. 11663 of 2003,
reprinted in 32 Y.B. Com. Arb. 107 (2007), Final Award in case no. 12172, reprinted in 32 Y.B. Com. Arb. 85
(2007).
62
See ICC No. 12127, op. cit. (the losing Respondent was ordered to pay 5/6 of the arbitral costs, while only paying
2/3 of the legal costs); ICC No. 13278, op. cit. (the losing Respondent was ordered to pay 70% of the arbitral costs
and less than that percentage in legal costs).
63
CIETAC Arbitration Rules states that “[t]he arbitral tribunal has the power to decide in the award, according to
the specific circumstances of the case, that the losing party shall compensate the winning party for the expenses
reasonably incurred by it in pursuing its case.” See CIETAC Arbitration Rules, available at
http://www.Cietac.org.cn/English/rules/rules.htm.
64
See J. Gotanda, “Monetary Remedies in International Arbitration: A Comparison Between International
Commercial Disputes and International Investment Disputes (forthcoming 2010).
65
See S. Franck, op. cit., pp. 68-69.
66
See ibid., p. 69.
67
See ibid.
68
See ibid.
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parties. However, given the limited data this finding suggests that governments’ expenses in
defending international investment arbitrations are perhaps not as large as previously believed.69
Recent investment arbitration awards show no uniform practice concerning the award of
costs and fees. In cases where the respondent prevails, many ICSID tribunals have ordered the
parties to share equally the costs of the arbitration and to assume their own legal costs.70 For
example, in World Duty Free Company Limited v. Republic of Kenya and Helnan International
Hotels v. Egypt, the tribunal dismissed the claimants’ claims, but declined to award the
respondent any costs and fees. Instead, it required claimant and respondent to share the costs of
the arbitrations and to bear their own legal costs.71 However, in International Thunderbird
Gaming Corporation v. the United Mexican States, the tribunal rejected the claimant’s
allegations of breach of treaty and required the claimant to pay 75% of the costs and fees.72 In
addition, in Telenor Mobile Communications v. Republic of Hungary, the tribunal dismissed all
claims for lack of jurisdiction and ordered the claimant to reimburse the respondent for both its
contributions to the cost of the arbitration and its legal costs, which totaled approximately
US$1.4 million.73

69

See ibid., pp. 69-70.
See Aguaytia, Jan de Nul N.V., L.E.S.I. SpA,
Aguaytia Energy LLC v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/13, Award, 11 December 2008, available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/AguaytiaAward_001.pdf; Jan de Nul N.V. and Dredging International N.V. v. Arab
Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/13, Award, 6 November 2008, available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/JandeNulNVaward.pdf ; L.E.S.I. S.p.A. et ASTALDI S.p.A. v. Algeria, ICSID
Case No. ARB/05/3, Award, 12 November 2008, available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/LESIAward.pdf ;
Continental Casualty Company v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, 5 September 2008, available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ContinentalCasualtyAward.pdf ; Metalpar S.A. and Buen Aire S.A. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No., Award, 6 June 2008, available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/MetalparAwardEng.pdf ; Helnan International Hotels A/S v. Arab Republic of
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19. Award, 3 July 2008, available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/HelnanAward.pdf .
71
See World Duty Free Company Limited, op. cit; Helnan International Hotels, op. cit.
72
International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. Mexico, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Arbitral Award, 26 January
2006, available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ThunderbirdAward.pdf.
73
See Telenor Mobile Communications v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, 13 September 2006,
available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm. In that case, the tribunal stated its decision was
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In cases where the claimant has prevailed, the results have been more diverse. Some
tribunals have required parties to split arbitration costs and bear their own attorneys’ fees. For
example, in Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A. v. Republic of Ecuador, the
tribunal ordered the respondent to pay claimant approximately US$5.6 million. However, it
ruled, “[i]n the exercise of its discretion in matters of allocation of costs and considering all
circumstances of this case, the Tribunal finds it fair that the parties bear the costs of the
arbitration equally and that each party bears its own legal and other costs.”74 Similarly, in Duke
Energy International Peru Investments No. 1, Ltd. v. Peru, the tribunal awarded the claimant
approximately US$18.4 million in damages, but ordered each party to bear its own legal costs.75
Other tribunals have resolved claims for arbitration costs or legal costs, or both, based on
the principle of costs follow the event. For example, in ADC Affilliate Limited v. Hungary, the
tribunal awarded the successful claimants US$7.6 million to cover their costs and expenses in the
arbitration.76 In PSEG Global Inc. v. Republic of Turkey, the tribunal ordered the respondent to
bear 65% of the total legal costs and fees, amounting to US$13.6 million, and the claimant to
bear the remaining 35%, amounting to US$7.3 million.77 However, the tribunal in Siemens A.G.
v. Argentine Republic divided the arbitration costs between the parties on a 75%-25% basis, but
required each party to bear its own legal costs.78 Similarly, in Azurix Corp. v. Argentine
Republic, the tribunal determined that Argentina breached the bilateral investment treaty (BIT)

based on both the principle of costs follow the event and on the fact that the claimant had engaged in misconduct
during the arbitration.
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Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No ARB/04/19, Award
of 18 August 2008, para. 490, available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/DukeEcuadorAward_003.pdf.
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Duke Energy International Peru Investments No. 1, Ltd. v. Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/28, Award of 25 July
2008, para. 490, available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/ViewPdf/ic/Awards/law-iic-334-2008.pdf. In that
case, the parties had agreed to share equally the costs of the arbitration.
76
ADC Affilliate Limited v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, 2 October 2006, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/awards.htm.
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See PSEG Global Inc., op. cit.
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See Siemens A.G., op. cit.
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and thus owed the claimant US$165 million for the fair market value of the concession.
However, it required each party to be responsible for its own costs and counsel fees, but ordered
the respondent to bear most of the fees and expenses of the tribunal.79
In some cases, tribunals award only legal fees or only tribunal costs. However, this
practice has not been uniform. Nor has there been any apparent reason for the distinction. This
inconsistency is visible in two recent 2009 ICSID arbitrations. In Waguih Elie George Siag and
Clorinda Vecchi v. The Arab Republic of Egypt, the claimants were successful on their
substantive claims and the respondent was ordered to pay approximately US$74.6 million in
damages. With respect to costs and fees, however, the tribunal awarded the claimants US$6
million for their legal costs, but ordered the claimants to bear half of the arbitration costs and
respondents to bear the remaining half. In reaching its decision on costs and fees, the tribunal
commented: “Tribunal has also taken due note of the decisions made by previous ICSID
Tribunals, in light of which it appears that the practice of such Tribunals has not been uniform
and that the present Tribunal therefore has a broad discretion to apportion costs.”80 By contrast,
in Bernardus Henricus Funnekotter and others v. Republic of Zimbabwe, the tribunal decided to
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See Azurix v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, 14 July 2006, available at
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Award and Dissenting Opinion, 1 June 2009, para. 617, available at
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allocate only tribunal costs to the winning party and not legal fees because the respondent, the
Republic of Zimbabwe, faced economic hardships during that period.81
A number of tribunals have ordered the payment of costs and fees as a sanction for
misconduct, for example, asserting spurious claims or engaging in bad-faith litigation.82 For
instance, in Phoenix Action Ltd. v. The Czech Republic, the tribunal characterized the claimant’s
behavior as “an abuse of the international investment protection regime” and ordered it to pay all
the costs and fees.83 And in Plama Consortium Limited v. Bulgaria, the tribunal rejected all of
the claimant’s substantive claims and found that the claimant had engaged in misconduct during
the arbitration. The tribunal ordered the claimant to bear all the fees and expenses of the tribunal
and to pay respondent US$460,000 on account of Respondent’s advance on costs as well as
US$7 million for respondent’s legal costs and fees.84
IV. The Proposals
Because there is no uniform practice for awarding costs and fees in international
commercial arbitrations and in international investment disputes, similarly situated parties have
received vastly different awards. More importantly, this state of affairs has made it impossible
for parties to predict with any degree of certainty the results of their claims for costs and fees.
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As the United States Supreme Court recently noted, predictability is essential to a fair
and well functioning adjudicatory system.85 This is especially true with respect to international
arbitration. To the extent that results are unpredictable, parties may view arbitration as unfair
and fail to choose it as a means of resolving disputes.86 In addition, lack of predictability
discourages parties from settling cases and thus reduces the efficiency of the system.87 As one
commentator explained:
[I]t must be a prerequisite to any international arbitration that the parties know
well in advance what to budget for costs, and that the cost system of the
administering institution is fully transparent from the outset, so that clients and
their counsel know how their money will be spent and if they can expect to
recoup it fully or in part. Furthermore, a party should be in a position to
reasonably predict the level of financial risk that it will incur in an arbitration, and
the conditions it needs to satisfy to make a good claim for costs…. Knowing the
mechanisms of a given arbitration cost system, and the impact of its application
… may … help a party decide in a particular case whether it should file
counterclaims, advance the arbitration costs in lieu of the other party, or simply
discontinue the proceedings.88
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See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 54 U.S.__ (U.S. Sup. Ct. 2008).
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Moreover, the lack of predictability hinders counsel from advising clients on the most prudent
course of action. These problems are exacerbated in investment arbitrations, where parties on
average spend millions of dollars to resolve a dispute before ICSID and awards are often
published.89
I believe that these problems can be remedied in investment arbitrations by the adoption
of a default rule90 that provides for the parties to divide equally the costs of the arbitration and
for each to bear its own attorneys’ fees and costs.91 In other words, I propose that ICSID
tribunals essentially follow the American Rule. Four reasons support this proposal.
First and foremost, it would provide a clear rule, thus bringing much needed
predictability to the area. While the CFE method has in theory the benefit of making a party
whole for the expense in prosecuting or defending valid claims, its administration is premised on
subjective criteria and broad discretion on the part of tribunals.92 This deficiency has ultimately
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resulted in similarly situated parties being treated differently.93 Thus, the need for a bright line
rule outweighs the theoretical benefit of the CFE approach – to make the prevailing party whole
for the costs of litigating.
Second, along the same lines, this practice would provide greater administrative
efficiency. Adopting the American Rule would eliminate the need for parties to brief and argue
the issues of costs and fees and, correspondingly, tribunals would not need to devote time to
determining whether a party “won” and how much it should award to the successful party in
costs and fees.94
Third, adopting this method may have the effect of reducing the overall costs of resolving
disputes before ICSID.95 As commentators have pointed out, in contrast to the American Rule,
the CFE method gives the parties the incentive to spend more money because larger damages at
stake.96 Under the CFE method, parties’ costs theoretically increase as they take into account the
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probability of paying the winning parties’ costs and fees.97 Arbitration costs may also increase,
as fee shifting causes parties to argue over the amount of costs and fees that should be shifted to
the losing parties.98
Fourth, the nature of investment disputes, as well as the involvement of governments,
counsels against awarding costs and fees in investment arbitrations. Investment disputes often
involve issues concerning whether a government is acting in its sovereign capacity,99 and an
award of costs against the government may ultimately be shouldered by its constituents, who
may be in the weakest position to bear the financial burden.100 As the late Thomas Walde
pointed out in his separate opinion in International Thunderbird Gaming Corp., imposing costs
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on losing investors may have the effect of undermining the very purpose of investment treaties
and could “cast a chill over attempts” by small companies with fewer financial resources to seek
the protections afforded by the treaties.101
With respect to international commercial arbitrations, however, I do not advocate the
same approach. In this context, parties have greater ability to agree on how they want the issue
of costs and fees to be decided. In investment arbitrations, parties often bring claims pursuant to
a BIT or multilateral treaty that provides for arbitration of disputes under the ICSID Rules or
ICSID Additional Facilities Rules. However, parties in international commercial arbitrations
have the power via their contract to determine how the issue of costs and fees is to be resolved.
For example, they may place a provision in their agreement providing for a tribunal to award
costs and fees to the prevailing party in the event of a dispute. Alternatively, they may select a
set of rules, such as the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, that provides that the costs of arbitration
“shall in principle be borne by the unsuccessful party,” while legal costs are left to the tribunal’s
discretion.102 In addition, they may choose to have any disputes resolved pursuant to national
laws or rules that provide for the awarding of costs and fees to the winning party. In other
words, in international commercial arbitration, there is less of a concern over the need for a
bright line rule because the parties can tailor the dispute to fit their particular needs or
circumstances.
Similarly, in the commercial context, party autonomy would prevail over administrative
efficiency.103 That is, if parties agree that making a party whole through the CFE approach
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outweighs achieving any savings from the administration of the American Rule, then tribunals
should respect that decision.104
In addition, in commercial contract disputes, it is perhaps easier to determine who is “the
winning party” than in investment disputes, because the legal rules for determining liability and
damages may be clearer than in the investment context. For example, United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) provides detailed rules for
determining whether a breach of contract has occurred and the remedies for such breach. In
addition, many of these rules, including the provisions on the calculation of damages, are based
on principles found in many legal systems, and thus are familiar to parties and arbitrators. For
example, where the contract has been avoided because of a breach and the aggrieved party has
entered into a cover transaction, CISG article 75 provides for damages to be the difference
between the contract price and any cover purchase or sale.105 If the aggrieved party did not enter
into a cover transaction, CISG article 76 allows for the recovery of the difference between the
market price of the goods and the contract price.106 Both remedies are commonly found in
national laws, are relatively easy to apply, and result in predictable damages.
By contrast, in investment arbitrations involving expropriations, claimants may seek to
recover the value of their business that has been taken. Determining damages in this
circumstance is a much more complicated process; tribunals follow no consistent set of uniform
rules. Indeed, in such a situation, tribunals may use one of three methods or a combination of

fair to say that the parties’ autonomy to select the substantive law governing their international commercial relations
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them: (1) the asset-based approach; (2) the market-based approach; (3) the discounted cash flow
(DCF) method. While the DCF method in theory provides an accurate method for calculating
damages, in practice it can be difficult to apply because it involves determining the value of the
business by projecting the net cash flows for a certain period in the future and then discounting
them back to the present value as of the date of the wrongful act. This process involves many
assumptions, estimates and other subjective criteria that ultimately may result in parties differing
greatly on the amount of damages and decisions that seem arbitrary and inconsistent.107
Moreover, commercial disputes, particularly those involving the CISG, tend to involve
much smaller sums than investment disputes, and thus legal fees tend to be much lower.108 And
because governments acting in their sovereign capacity is not an issue, awards of costs and fees
in commercial disputes tend to be less controversial.109
V. Conclusion
In sum, my proposal advocates the adoption of the American Rule, with respect to the
award of costs and fees in ICSID cases. This proposal would foster more predictable outcomes,
greater administrative efficiency, and a reduction in overall costs. In addition, it would
recognize that in some disputes, tribunals decide public policy issues that counsel against
107

See J. Gotanda, “Recovering Lost Profits in International Disputes” 36 Geo. J. Int’l L.61, 91-93 (2004); see also
S. de Quidt P. Rees, “Methods of Valuation: Which Method For Which Case?,” Investment Treaty Law Current
Issues III: Remedies in International Investment Law, Emerging Jurisprudence of International Investment Law 61,
73 (Andrea K. Bjorklund, Ian A. Laird and Sergey Ripinsky eds., The British Institute of International and
Comparative Law 2009) (stating that income-based approaches, like the DCF “are dependent on the availability of
informatsion, in particular well-considered and reliable projections for the asset in question as of the valuation date”
and the “information available may not be sufficiently robust to produce a reliable DCF analysis”).
108
See J. Gotanda, "Monetary Remedies in International Arbitration: A Comparison between International
Commercial Disputes and International Investment Disputes,” op. cit.
109
However, due to the tremendous expense, cost and fee awards remain controversial in the investment arbitration
context. See S. Franck, op. cit., p. 18. In fact, in 2009, President Morales of Bolivia expressed his dissatisfaction
with ICSID by conveying that “the average budget for a minor case which includes the fees of one and a half
arbitrators, plus lawyers, experts and travel is about three million dollars. This cost may be marginal for giant
corporations but impossible for small countries. Justice so priced is justice denied.” President Evo Morales of
Bolivia, “Peoples Rights Before Corporate Profits: Closing of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) and challenging free trade agreements in the road to build a just economic and social governance”
(June 25, 2009).

22

awarding costs and fees to the prevailing party. These reasons, however, do not apply with the
same force in transnational commercial disputes. In these cases, I would give the parties the
ability to agree on appropriate rules for resolving cost and fee claims, including giving the
tribunal the authority to apply the CFE method.
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